REVIEW-BEYOND REPAIR: THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE CIA

The deterioration and collapse of the CIA are beyond repair. 2009 publication by Charles S. Faddis; isbn number: 9781599218519 As suggested by the book’s title, the author, a CIA veteran, is not of the opinion that the organization need improvement or “tweaking.” He is adamant in his conviction that it should be demolished and rebuilt from the ground up. During World War II, while the Oss was in operation, an individual or group would be given a task, which often included being dropped inside enemy lines, and ordered to make it happen. In order to accomplish the goal, they would have to make it happen. They saw employment in intelligence as akin to a vocation or a calling from God. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is now staffed by career bureaucrats and those who see their position as nothing more than an ordinary government job. Even if it may potentially save lives in the United States, causing a stir is considered to be a cardinal offense. It would seem that the remedy to problems with intelligence gathering, such as those that occurred on September 11, is to increase the number of bureaucratic levels and the amount of “coordination” in place. Participants in the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (rotc) get training and are regularly evaluated by the United States Army. If a person is unable to meet the requirements of the army, they will be requested to withdraw from the program. There is no such training program offered by the CIA. Someone may be an excellent case officer, but if they were put in a position of leadership, they would be completely ineffective. When an intelligence opportunity presents itself, the CIA is still able to pull together a clandestine operation in a matter of days, or even hours, despite the bureaucratic red tape that plagues the organization. Before a final permission can be given, other organizations like the military and the FBI require months and months of briefings, re-briefings, assessments, and approval from a variety of different personnel. Because of this, the author has a strong conviction that the CIA ought to be the sole agency responsible for gathering foreign information, and that all other agencies need to cease their involvement in gathering foreign intelligence. The United States Ambassador is the highest-ranking official in charge at any foreign embassy. Without his (or her) authorization, no covert action will be carried out. Even if the clandestine operation would save lives, the State Department’s main guideline appears to be “don’t upset the host nation.” The ambassador works for the State Department, which has this regulation in place. There are going to be visits from Washington officials sometimes, and these people have no idea what a clandestine operation is even if it was there in front of them. They often have this beautiful intelligence notion, which sounds great in a Langley conference room, but on the ground, it is an excellent idea that is ridiculous. The previous standard for the level of difficulty of the physical training required of covert agents was set rather high, reflecting the need that agents be ready to handle almost any situation. Over the course of time, standards have been watered down to an almost insignificant level. The training that was formerly described as “extremely tough” is now more accurately described as “mildly stressful.” Because the CIA is in desperate need of personnel on the ground, the physical qualifications for the program have been lowered to the point that individuals from other divisions have been allowed to participate. It makes no difference if they suffer from asthma, diabetes, or any other serious condition. If they finish the course (there are no consequences if they don’t), they will suddenly believe that they are qualified to travel abroad and work on genuine covert operations, right next to someone who has 20 years of expertise. If they don’t finish the course, there will be no consequences. This is a book that is quite critical, but it is one that is desperately needed. Regardless of how you feel about the recent conduct of the CIA, the United States of America need some kind of foreign intelligence organization. This book is a good starting point for putting up a company in the appropriate method, which is the path that will be taken by the agency. Paul Lappen is a freelance book critic whose blog, dead trees review, focuses on books produced by independent presses and self-publishers.